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Abstract
Keynes’ main concern in the General Theory is about the capacity
of an economy to return to a full employment equilibrium when sub-
ject to a (negative) demand shock. He maintains that money wages
cuts may not help reabsorb unemployment, as they do not necessar-
ily imply a fall in real wages. On the contrary, wage rigidity may
be necessary for avoiding that a cumulative process propels the econ-
omy far away the full employment equilibrium. The consideration of
co-ordination failures in the investment-saving market is behind this
conclusion. However, the analysis is carried out within a static equi-
librium framework.
This paper is an attempt to focus on the problems of intertemporal
co-ordination arising within the context of a sequential economy. Our
analysis of the out-of-equilibrium process of adjustment stirred by a
shock of whatever nature allows to generalize the original Keynesian
intuition. It shows in fact that unemployment emerges as the result of
a lack of co-ordination due to irreversibly constrained choices, and that
not only nominal but also real wage flexibility does not necessarily help
to restore equilibrium. As a matter of fact, it may even be harmful, by
triggering processes that make the economy diverge from equilibrium.
The analysis carried out has important analytical implications as
regards the role of market imperfections and the interpretation of the
effects of monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
Neo-classical and new-Keynesian economics alike explain involuntary unem-
ployment as the result of real wage rigidity. The neo-classical analysis also
postulates a positive correlation between nominal and real wages (generally
confirmed by empirical observations) so that any cut in money wages should
result in a cut in real wages. As a consequence, money wage rigidities as-
sociated with some specific bargaining arrangements on the labour market
would be responsible for involuntary unemployment. According to Keynes
instead, the wage bargains between the entrepreneurs and the workers do
not determine the real wage, and “there may exist no expedient by which
labour as a whole can reduce its real wage to a given figure by making re-
vised money bargains with the entrepreneurs” (Keynes 1936, p. 13). That
means that co-ordination failures at the system level rather than at the
labour market level would be responsible for unemployment which will be
then involuntary in the strict sense. Recent contributions can be considered
as a revival of this line of analysis (Hart 1982, D’Aspremont, Dos Santos
Ferreira, and Ge´rard-Varet 1990). They argue that imperfect competition
in the markets for goods would be responsible for the existence of involun-
tary unemployment even at a level of real wages inferior to the competitive
(or Walrasian) one. In this framework co-ordination takes place ex ante on
a strategic basis and results in a general equilibrium with involuntary un-
employment the existence of which is clearly explained by the existence of
firms’ (and unions) market power. Nevertheless, this unemployment could
always be reduced, if not totally reabsorbed, thanks to a cut in real wages.
We share with Keynes the belief that co-ordination is the central issue
in economic activity. But we think that it is better tackled by abandon-
ing the equilibrium approach that characterizes Keynes’ General Theory,
and seeing the working of the economy as a sequential out-of-equilibrium
process. Involuntary unemployment appears then as the result of a lack
of co-ordination which emerges along the way, at each step, and cannot
disappear simply by allowing price and wage flexibility. The study of out-
of-equilibrium processes, in the Hicksian tradition (Hicks, 1973, Amendola
and Gaffard, 1988,1998), allows to switch the focus from the analysis of price
systems corresponding to alternative equilibrium states of the economy to
the sequence of constrained decisions that describes an economic process
taking place in time.
The main results of the Keynesian analysis re-emerge in this different
framework. However, our analysis makes it possible to advance farther along
this line by extending to real wages Keynes’ conclusions as regards money
wages (thus challenging the classical inverse relation between real wages and
unemployment). We show that (i) real as well as nominal rigidities, instead
of being an obstacle to the attainment of full employment, may appear as
an useful device for preventing an aggravation of unemployment; and hence
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that (ii) market imperfections may be a factor of stability of the system
rather than an obstacle on the way to the optimal equilibrium. Finally, our
analysis shifts the focus of monetary policy from its effects on employment
via changes in the distribution of income or in the burden of the debt to its
effects via the structure of productive capacity.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will shortly summarize
Leijonhufvud’s pioneering argument, that the General Theory may be seen
as an “Essay on co-ordination”, and will mention other ‘Keynesian’ contribu-
tions (Dre`ze 1997, Stiglitz 1999) along the same line; we shall then underline
some deficiencies of these approaches, that in our opinion were crucial in the
re-absorption of the Keynesian analysis within the mainstream. Section 3
will describe the approach that we propose along Hicksian lines, based on
irreversibilities in the production and in the decision processes, which give a
real temporal dimension to the analysis. Then in section 4 we shall show, by
means of simulations, how Keynesian results emerge, more robustly, from
this new approach. Section 5 concludes with an examination of the simi-
larities and differences between the economics of Keynes and the approach
proposed here.
2 Co-ordination Problems and Price Rigidity: From
Static to Sequential Analysis
According to Keynes the level of activity and of employment is determined
by aggregate demand. This crucially depends on expectations (of the firms,
on the marginal efficiency of capital, and of the speculators, on the mon-
etary rate of interest), which affect consumption and investment decisions.
‘Wrong’ expectations may cause intertemporal co-ordination failures in the
investment-saving market. The nominal interest rate that assures the stock
equilibrium in the money market L-M may not be such that the full employ-
ment flow equilibrium in the I-S market is guaranteed. This co-ordination
failure in the capital and money market may yield an insufficient aggregate
demand, and hence an equilibrium with involuntary unemployment.
The equilibrium analysis of the IS-LM model only captures part of
Keynes’ argument, thus leading to interpret Keynes as a fix-price (and hence
short run) case of the general Walrasian model. In this framework, un-
employment can only stem from nominal rigidities in the relevant market,
namely, that for labour. However, as is well known, Keynes denies the effi-
ciency of a decrease in the nominal wages as a means for reducing involuntary
unemployment. On the contrary, he argues that convergence to a market
clearing real wage cannot be assumed as the effect of a process of repeated
money wage bargains, since this process may bring about changes in the
overall demand for output that have an adverse effect on real wages. Thus,
“if money-wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a tendency
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for less than full employment, [...] there would be no resting place below full
employment until either the rate of interest was incapable of falling further,
or wages were zero. In fact, we must have some factor, the value of which
in terms of money is, if not fixed, at least sticky, to give us any stability of
values in a monetary system” (Keynes, 1936, p. 303). Keynes reverses the
common wisdom on wage rigidity, which helps to avoid the implosion of the
system rather than being a source of disequilibrium. However, no sequential
framework makes the actual dynamic process clear.
Leijonhufvud (1968) interprets the economics of Keynes as the attempt
to see unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon linked to the se-
quential adjustment process following an exogenous disturbance, namely,
a change in the marginal efficiency of capital. Co-ordination problems arise
in the market for saving and investment, where agents with different time
horizons interact. In fact, when the real shock above mentioned occurs,
“financial markets are manifestly incapable of providing for the consistency
of long-term production and consumption plans...(which) does not insure a
‘correct’ value for the interest rate” (ibidem, p. 276). Entrepreneurs base
their demand of loanable funds on the current rate of interest, while supply
is determined on the secondary market by the portfolio choices of specula-
tors who refer to the spread between expected and actual interest rates. A
drop in the demand of loanable funds following an exogenous shock (here
a fall in the marginal efficiency of capital), will not necessarily affect ex-
pectations on the secondary market; consequently, the interest mechanism
will fail to recover co-ordination by re-establishing investment at its full em-
ployment level. Trade then takes place at a false price, at which ex ante
saving and investment are not equated, and it is therefore income that has
to change in order to restore the equality. The conclusion, according to Lei-
jonhufvud, is obvious: “It was Keynes’ position that it is the failure of the
incomplete market mechanism to reconcile the implied values of forward de-
mand and supplies [...] that is the source of the trouble. Unemployment of
labor and other resources is a derivative phenomenon” (Leijonhufvud 1968
p. 276). The ‘source of the trouble’ does not lie in the labour market.
Unemployment is the consequence of an intertemporal co-ordination failure:
of a missing market where investment and saving decisions should be fully
coordinated.
The belief that co-ordination failures cannot be identified with price dis-
tortions and hence that price flexibility is not always the way to re-establish
co-ordination is also shared by other authors who have revisited the prob-
lem of price rigidity in a Keynesian perspective. Thus Dre`ze (1997), who
analyzes the problem within a general equilibrium model with rationing,
demand externalities and market power, distinguishes between price dis-
tortions and co-ordination failures as different sources of the appearance
of supply constraints and of inefficient allocations of resources, and hence
writes: “It is not obvious at all that price or wage adjustments susceptible
4
of removing inefficiencies caused by price distortions would also operate in
the right direction, or with any effectiveness, to circumvent co-ordination
failures”(ibid. p.1753). The real problem, then, is :“the movement from one
supply- constrained equilibrium to another as a topic in dynamics, invit-
ing the study of adjustment processes defined over prices (...), quantities,
price expectations and plans”(ibid.). An attempt to investigate the main as-
pects of these adjustment processes has recently been made by Stiglitz who
stresses that “Shocks lead to marked changes in relative prices, and those
disturbances in relative prices greatly exacerbate economic fluctuations [...]
The risks associated with wage and price adjustments may well be larger
that those associated with output adjustments” (Stiglitz, 1999, pp. 75 and
76). These two authors thus implicitly argue that the co-ordination problem
is not the problem of a missing market, but must rather be seen in the light
of adjustment processes.
We maintain that the essence of adjustment processes are the links be-
tween successive periods, mainly related to production and money. In this
perspective, a restructuring of productive capacity is the essential aspect
of the adjustment process aimed at re-establishing co-ordination. We shall
show in fact in the next section that the co-ordination failures, and the mis-
alignment of investment, on which unemployment depends, are associated
with a breaking of the intertemporal complementarity of the production
process and the appearance of financial constraints. These co-ordination
failures, whatever their cause, are thus fossilized in the capital stock, i.e. in
the temporal structure of productive capacity, and in financial constraints .
The handing over of these real and financial stocks carries the disequilibria
down the sequence of periods that makes up the adjustment process.
In an equilibrium perspective, co-ordination results from a choice car-
ried out ex ante. Co-ordination failures appear as a consequence of the
existence of multiple Pareto ranked equilibria1: they are nothing but co-
ordination on bad equilibria. Out of equilibrium we have to deal instead
with a process sketched out step by step by sequentially interacting dise-
quilibria. Co-ordination problems arise as the result of this process taking
place. In this perspective, the problem caused by trading at disequilibrium
prices lies not so much in the persistence of these prices (i.e. in the sticky
prices), which is theoretically hard to defend, but rather into two features
of this trading that are mentioned but not developed by Keynes and Lei-
jonhufvud: the appearance of quantity constraints that at each moment in
time affect the agent’s plans; and the sequence of suboptimal choices trig-
gered by these constraints, which renders the very notion of an equilibrium
price meaningless as the price itself would change continuously along the
adjustment process.
What really matters, then, are the effects of the exchanges at disequi-
1See Cooper and John (1988) and Silvestre (1993).
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librium prices on the stocks of the economy, which are the links of the
out-of-equilibrium process that shapes out the adjustment. We shall see
that in this light price and wage rigidities, far from witnessing the inability
of agents to take advantage of market information, could be seen as the
expression of a rational behaviour.
Leijonhufvud and Stiglitz have already dealt with financial stocks, with
particular reference to the impact of changes in asset values on the adjust-
ment process. Real stocks, and the interactions with financial stocks in an
out-of-equilibrium context, are instead at the centre of the analysis that will
be carried out in the following sections.
3 The Model
We appeal to a model based on Hicks (1973) and Amendola and Gaffard
(1988, 1998) whose main characteristic is the articulation in time of both
the production and the decision processes. In our setting on the one hand
production takes time, and hence costs come before revenues; and on the
other, decisions are taken step by step given the constraints inherited from
the past. Only in such a framework in fact it is possible to properly study
the problems of co-ordination over time of economic activity, and the se-
quence of constrained decisions that make up the out-of-equilibrium process
of adjustment mentioned but not fully sketched out by Leijonhufvud, Dre`ze
and Stiglitz.2
Consider a sequential economy of a neo-Austrian type which uses a ho-
mogeneous labour resource. Labour is inputted for n periods to build the
productive capacity, and used for the following N to operate it and obtain
a final output. An elementary process of production is defined by input
coefficients such that:
ac = [aci ] , a
c
i = a
c, ∀i = 1, ..., n
(1)
au = [aui ] , a
u
i = a
u, ∀i = n+ 1, ..., n+N
and output coefficients
b = [bi] , bi = b,∀i = n+ 1, ..., n+N (2)
The productive capacity of the economy is given by the number of pro-
cesses in use at the moment t, in construction, xc(t), and in utilization,
xu(t):
x(t) = [xc(t),xu(t)] (3)
2Saraceno (2003) shows that to yield meaningful disequilibrium dynamics, we need both
adaptive expectations and the articulation in time of production.
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This capacity is subject to ageing and to modifications due to investment
and scrapping. The economy enters each period with a given productive
capacity, and a set of prices for labour (w(t)) and for final output (p(t)).
These prices only change at the junction between periods, while within the
period market disequilibria result in supply or demand rationing. In other
words, this is a fix-price model (Hicks 1956).
At the beginning of the period, firms choose how much to produce and
how much to invest, subject to a number of constraints. Desired supply is
determined adaptively3 from demand observed in the previous period:
sˆ(t) = de(t) = [1 + ged(t)]d(t− 1) (4)
ged(t) = (1− λ)
τ∑
i=1
λi−1gd(t− i) (5)
with hats denoting desired quantities. The expected growth rate of demand,
ged(t) is a weighted average of τ past values of the growth rate gd
4. Desired
supply may be greater or smaller than the sum of productive capacity and
the unsold stocks carried over by previous periods which are put back in the
market. In the first case, the firm will be constrained and hence produce at
its maximum capacity. Otherwise, it will be forced to partially utilize (or
equivalently to scrap) some processes.
sˆ(t) ≥ bxu(t) + o(t− 1)⇒ s˜(t) = bxu(t) + o(t− 1)
(6)
sˆ(t) < bxu(t) + o(t− 1)⇒ q˜(t) = bx˜u(t) = sˆ(t)− o(t− 1)
where the tildes denote constrained quantities, q(t) and o(t− 1) are produc-
tion and the stock of goods previously accumulated respectively.
While they form demand expectations on a day-by-day basis, firms rec-
ognize that investment is an inherently long term phenomenon, and hence
do not alter their behaviour in response to short term disequilibria. Invest-
ment (i.e. construction) decisions are always taken such as to maintain a
balanced structure of productive capacity: the planned number of new pro-
cesses is the one consistent with the steady state (long run) position of the
economy:
xˆ1(t) = (1 + g∗)nxn(t) (7)
where g∗ is the steady state growth rate of the economy.
Firm’s planned production and investment decisions are constrained by
available financial or human resources: The total of wages that they plan to
pay is
3Backward looking behaviour may be seen as the most rational (in terms of costs)
choice by boundedly rational agents facing a complex environment.
4If λ = 1, we have static expectations (de(t) = d(t − 1)); while τ = 1 is the standard
adaptive expectations case: de(t) = [1 + ψgd(t− 1)]d(t− 1)
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ωˆ(t) = w(t)Ld(t) = w(t)[ac1xˆ1(t)+
n∑
i=2
acixi(t)+a
ux˜u(t)] = ωˆc(t)+ωˆu(t) (8)
where Ld is the total demand for labour and w is the wage rate. Firms
demand external financial resources to pay whatever of this wage fund is
not covered by internal resources:
fd(t) = ωˆ(t)−m(t− 1)− hf (t− 1) + c(t) + hfd(t) (9)
Internal resources are revenues (m), plus money balances (hf ), carried over
from the previous period, minus the take-out (c), and whatever firms de-
sire to hoard in the current period (hfd). The take-out, c(t), defined as
the fraction of available financial resources not spent on production pro-
cesses (which might stand for private and/or social consumption) is such
that c(t) = µm(t − 1). The difference between the total of wages that
firms plan to pay and the available internal resources gives the demand for
external money resources fd(t).
External money demand is matched with money supply fs, exogenously
determined by the monetary authority choosing among alternative monetary
policies:
f s(t) = fs(t− 1){(1− ζ)(1 + g∗) + ζ [1 + ξgfd − (1− ξ)gp(t− 1)]} (10)
where gfd is the growth rate of the money demand which may be higher
than g∗, and gp is the expected growth rate of the price level. ζ is an
indicator function. When it takes the value ζ = 0 a Friedman rule is applied
while with ζ = 1, broadly speaking, a Taylor rule prevails. In the latter case
ξ and 1− ξ are the weights of growth and inflation objectives respectively.
There is no interest rate in the model. It is implicitly considered as
a charge that contributes to determine the available financial resources at
each moment. In fact, the behaviour of the banking system is not explicitly
modelled.
It may be the case, if fd(t) > f s(t), that firms incur in a financial
constraint. Consequently they will not be able to carry on their investment
as planned:
ω˜(t) = ωˆ(t)−
[
fd(t)− f s(t)
]
(11)
This financial constraint is endogenous insofar as it results from the previous
market disequilibria and of the way these disequilibria have been dealt with
in the past. Indeed, as we shall see, inappropriate changes in the wage rate
will trigger changes in the structure of productive capacity that will result
in an endogenously determined financial constraint.
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The resources to be used in utilization and in construction will be reduced
by the financial constraint:
ω˜u = min(ωˆu, ω˜)
(12)
ω˜c = max(ω˜ − ωˆu, 0)
Equations (12) model a rational behaviour by firms, that tend to preserve
older processes which will be profitable sooner: in the first place will be
reduced the resources devoted to investment/construction, and then those
devoted to production/utilization.
The lack of resources will cause the scrapping of production processes.
For some i then, we shall have5
x˜i(t) < xˆi(t) (13)
In some sense, the scrapping of production processes reveals the existence
of bankruptcy issues.
The firm may also be limited by the amount of labour available on the
market (we assume that the labour market opens after the financial market).
Labour supply evolves as follows:
Ls(t) = Ls(t− 1)(1 + gpop)[1 + gw(t− 1)] (14)
where gpop is the exogenous population growth rate, and gw(t − 1) is the
growth rate of wages. Labour demand on the other hand is given by
Ld(t) = ac1x˜1(t) +
n∑
i=2
aci x˜i(t) + a
ux˜u(t) (15)
If firms incur in a human resource constraint (Ld > Ls), they will be forced
to cumulate money stocks (hf ) and further scrap processes, while if the
contrary holds, unemployment will appear.
Once the two constraints are taken into account, the number of processes
and the wage fund can be determined
xi(t) ≤ x˜i(t) ≤ xˆi(t)
(16)
ω(t) ≤ ω˜(t) ≤ ωˆ(t)
where the second inequality of each equation holds if the financial constraint
is binding, while the first holds if the human resources constraint is binding
(one or more equal signs will imply the lack of constraints).
5Again, the rational behaviour will be modelled in the simulations below by assuming
that younger processes (lower i) are scrapped first.
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Final demand depends on the wage fund - there is no saving from wage
earners - the social consumption and the past idle balances of households
hh(t− 1):
d(t) =
ω(t) + c(t) + hh(t− 1)
p(t)
(17)
The last market to open is the market for final output, where demand
and supply are matched. In case of market disequilibria we can have invol-
untary accumulation of real stocks (o) by firms or monetary stocks (hh) by
households:
o(t) = max [0, s(t)− d(t)] , (18)
or:
hh(t) = p(t)max [0, d(t)− s(t)] (19)
Internal finance constraints derive from these market disequilibria:
m(t) = p(t)min [s(t), d(t)] (20)
This marks the end of the period. At the junction between periods wages and
prices change in response to disequilibria in the goods and labour markets:
gp(t+ 1) = κ
d(t)− s(t)
s(t)
(21)
gw(t+ 1) = ν
Ld(t)− Ls(t)
Ls(t)
where gp and gw are the rates of change of the price and the wage rate,
respectively. Between periods we also have ageing of productive capacity:
xi+1(t) = xi(t− 1), ∀i = 1...n+N − 1 (22)
In equilibrium this model behaves as a standard exogenous growth model.
All variables grow at the population growth rate, and per capita income and
consumption are constant. Expectations are fulfilled, co-ordination between
construction and utilization is attained. This implies a given ratio of con-
struction to utilization production processes to sustain a constantly growing
flow of final output and the investment required to maintain this flow. When
this is so, it is easy to see, investment and saving and supply and demand
of final output are also harmonized. No constraints appear, and no stocks
cumulate.
The characteristic of this model is nevertheless that it allows to analyze
behaviours outside equilibrium, a field in which mainstream theory has lit-
tle to say. Successive disequilibria between aggregate demand and aggregate
supply arise out of the failure of intertemporal co-ordination between sav-
ing and investment. This co-ordination failure, we have just seen, results in
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turn from a misalignment between production processes in the construction
and in the utilization phases (necessary outcome of a shock of whatever
kind), and prevents demand and supply to be adjusted at each moment of
time. The force that drives the evolution of the economy is therefore the
changes in the temporal structure of productive capacity, which no longer
sustains a steady state. But, of course, in a world characterized by ratio-
nal expectations, which means that agents maintain the required structure
of productive capacity and do not revise their plans in reaction to current
market disequilibria, considered as pure random events, the sequential di-
mension of the economic process would be cancelled and the structure of
productive capacity would go back into the shade. It is therefore the joint
effect of technical irreversibilities and adaptive expectations that causes a
meaningful out-of-equilibrium dynamics, and hence allows to investigate the
properties of our sequential economy.
We shall see that the out-of-equilibrium path followed by the economy
as the result of a shock may lead to cumulative processes, and, in particular,
that price stickiness may in that case be necessary to avoid the implosion of
the system.
4 The Simulation Analysis
Numerical simulations allow to explore how our model behaves out of equi-
librium. In particular, the simulation analysis carried out confirms Keynes’
results that money wage flexibility may not be enough to eliminate unem-
ployment, as its explanation is not confined to the labour market. The
path followed by the economy is the result of a process where prices inter-
act with quantities at the system level, and aggregate demand determines
prices and real wages. However, our analysis goes beyond that, by extending
to real wages Keynes’ conclusions as regards money wages (thus challeng-
ing the classical inverse relation between real wages and unemployment also
upheld by Keynes). The main result of our analysis, though, concerns the
co-ordination failure between consumption and investment that both Keynes
and Leijonhufvud indicate as the real source of the chain of effects leading
to the above conclusions. The focus that we put on a breaking of the in-
tertemporal complementarity of the phases of construction and utilization
of productive capacity as the result of a shock of whatever nature hitting
the economy deepens in fact the understanding of the saving-investment co-
ordination failure by throwing light on its structural source and stressing its
intertemporal character. A breaking of the intertemporal complementarity
of the production process brings about co-ordination problems that may stir
cumulative processes resulting in a threat to the viability of the adjustment
path followed by the economy. Among other things, price stickiness may in
that case be necessary to avoid the implosion of the system. The simulation
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analysis investigates the effects of a shock on the economy described by our
model, originally assumed to be in equilibrium, under different degrees of
price and wage flexibility, and different monetary policies.
Demand or supply shocks may be at the origin of out-of-equilibrium
adjustment processes. Here shocks matter only because they trigger adjust-
ment processes. Our main focus is on the loss of co-ordination following
the shocks, and on the role of different institutions (price and wage set-
ting mechanisms, monetary policies) in helping or hampering the recovery
of co-ordination. The essential role of these co-ordination mechanisms is
attested, as we shall see, by the result that the same normative conclusions
are obtained whatever the nature of the shock considered.
Let us start by describing in detail the effects of a demand shock. Con-
sider an economy in a steady-state (at a rate g∗ = 0), and assume that after
thirty periods, a lack of confidence in the existing state of affairs induces
firms to hoard a fraction ρ of their current revenues:
hfd(t) = ρ [m(t− 1)− c(t)] (23)
The shock stirs an out-of-equilibrium process which, given the behaviour of
the control variable f(t), mainly depends on the prevailing price and wage
regimes. The case of fixed prices and wages is depicted in figure 1. Hoarding
by firms reduces the wage fund: ω(30) = (1 − ρ) [m(29) + f(30)− c(30)];
consequently, the income perceived by the workers and their demand are
reduced. An excess supply appears in the market for final output, and
undesired stocks cumulate (o(30) > 0). In the following period, desired
supply drops (because of adaptive expectations on the firms side), and stocks
are put back on the market. As a consequence the desired production is
lower than productive capacity, and the firms scrap some processes in the
utilization phase. On the other hand, as we assume that the shock only
lasts one period, money balances from previous periods are put back on the
market. Thus we have excess demand on the market for final output (and,
hence, undesired monetary stocks accumulated by households); the excess
supply on the labour market persists, as production drops.
Due to the excess demand for final output the desired supply increases
in the next period. However, as the available revenues from the previous
periods are lower than they would be in the original steady-state, the ex-
ternal financial resources should increase at a higher rate to finance desired
production and investment. If this is not the case, as we assume in the
simulation of figure 1 (ζ = 0), firms will be unable to invest as much as they
want. The wage fund is thus reduced, demand becomes the short side of the
market and firms cumulate real stocks.
The simulation shows an alternation of excesses of supply and demand
which are gradually reduced as the adjustment process goes on. Each time
the level of activity will drop, until a point where the wage fund will stop
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Figure 1: Time series. Aggregate demand shock with fixed price and wage
(κ = ν = 0) and tight monetary policy.
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falling, and the demand will not further decrease. This will happen when ex-
pected and realized demand coincide. In the new situation, on the one hand
financial constraints result in recurrent fluctuations in the rate of starts,
which cannot be maintained at its previous equilibrium level. On the other
hand supply and demand for final output are equal at a level which im-
plies underutilization of labour. Summing up, the system settles on an
pseudo-equilibrium characterized by a lower level of activity and positive
unemployment: all plans are realized, except for the labour supply. This
corresponds to the standard Keynesian equilibrium. This first simulation
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Figure 2: Time series. Aggregate demand shock with fixed price (κ = 0),
flexible wage (ν = 0.05) and tight monetary policy.
highlights the crucial role of wages as a component of demand. The de-
crease of the wage fund feeds back into the value of demand, which in turn
causes scrapping and a further decrease of the wage fund. One may think
that this ‘Keynesian’ effect is caused by the hypothesis of fixed prices, and
that by allowing sufficient flexibility, the variation of prices and wages should
bring the system back to equilibrium. This is what was checked next.
By allowing the money wage rate, and hence the real wage rate, to change
(κ = 0 and ν = 0.05), as in figure 2, the shock is not reabsorbed, and the sys-
tem collapses. We said above that with fixed prices and wages the decrease
of demand happens at a decreasing rate, so that desired supply sooner or
later catches up. In this case instead, the mechanism described by Keynes
develops: The wage deflation (due to the recurrent excess labour supply),
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Figure 3: Histograms for a set of 900 simulations. Aggregate demand shock
with fixed price (κ = 0), tight monetary policy, and a wage reaction coeffi-
cient randomly chosen in the interval ν ∈ [0, 0.5].
keeps negatively affecting aggregate demand by progressively reducing the
wage fund. The process continues until production comes to a halt, and
the system collapses. In other words, wage flexibility sets the system on a
cumulative deflationary path, the same process envisioned by Keynes in a
different context (see the quote of page 3 above). As a matter of fact only
a positive demand shock, that is sustaining final demand, would allow to
reverse the process.
The result suggested by the analysis of a particular time series is con-
firmed by a Monte Carlo experiment on a set of 900 simulations correspond-
ing to different wage reaction coefficients randomly chosen in a given interval
[0, 0.5] , with fixed price, by means of the Monte-Carlo method. For all these
simulations unemployment has increased and real wages have decreased at
the end of the run (figure 3).
The conjecture that it is wage behaviour that hampers the viability is
confirmed by making prices flexible, while wages are kept constant. Figure
4 shows the same Monte-Carlo experiment, but having the price coefficient
randomly chosen, while the wage rate is fixed. In most cases unemployment
has slightly increased and real wages have slightly decreased at the end of
the run, that is a new equilibrium has been reached. The effect of price
flexibility is not as disruptive, because price drops affect at the same time
demand and supply.
We can now summarize the results of this first set of simulations: (i) A
shock entails a loss of intertemporal coordination, by disrupting the balance
between construction/investment and utilization/production. (ii) This co-
ordination failure affects the labour market, through changes in the wage
fund and hence in aggregate demand. (iii) Wage flexibility does not help
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Figure 4: Histograms for a set of 900 simulations. Aggregate demand shock
with fixed wage (ν = 0), tight monetary policy, and a price reaction coeffi-
cient randomly chosen in the interval κ ∈ [0, 0.5].
solve the problem because, as in Leijonhufvud, ‘the source of the problem’
does not lie within the labour market. Rather, it may trigger a cumulative
deflationary process.
Now suppose that the same economy as before is hit by a different (and
positive) type of shock: the introduction of a superior technology charac-
terized by an increase in construction costs more than compensated by the
reduction of costs in the following phase of utilization of the new productive
capacity6. With fixed prices and wages, and if the supply of money follows
the original steady-state growth rate of the economy, the aggregate supply
shock results in a new equilibrium characterized by a persistent unemploy-
ment (figure 5). With a flexible wage rate (κ = 0, ν = 0.05), co-ordination
problems, resulting in distortion of productive capacity7 bring about increas-
ing levels of unemployment, and decreasing real wages (figure 6). In neither
case the gains from the superior technique show in productivity figures; but
wage flexibility increases the instability of the system. A lower flexibility of
wages (up to ν = 0.01, the figure is available upon request), may cause the
system to settle down for a period, but the implosion will eventually occur.
Price and wage rigidities may only delay a cumulative recession. For the
productivity gains to be appropriated by the system monetary policy has
to remove the liquidity constraints faced by firms. Figures 5 and 6 showed
that fluctuations could not be adequately dealt with by firms, because any
6In the simulations we used ac = au = 8, for the old technology, while for the new we
have ac = 10 and au = 5. The new technology is on average labour saving, but involves a
larger effort in construction. The effects of technological shocks in the Hicksian framework
have been extensively studied in Amendola and Gaffard (1998).
7We define the distortion of productive capacity as the ratio between the sum of the
processes in utilization and the sum of the processes in construction.
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Figure 5: Time series. Supply shock with fixed prices and wages (κ = ν = 0)
and tight monetary policy.
attempt to invest and to bring productive capacity to its full employment
level was frustrated by the lack of financial means. If we assume (as in figure
7, where ζ = ξ = 1) a completely accommodating monetary policy on the
part of the central bank (or equivalently a perfectly efficient financial mar-
ket), investment is not constrained, the distortion of productive capacity is
only temporary, and the shock does not result in permanent unemployment.
In other words, the new and more productive technology is successfully in-
corporated into the system.8
The reader will have noticed that the qualitative behaviour, in the cases
of supply and demand shocks, is extremely similar; this confirms our claim
that the shock is only a trigger; the policy conclusion is then that the design
of institutions suited to facilitate the recovery of co-ordination has to be
independent of the type of shock.
To summarize the results, price and (especially) wage variability are
unable to act as co-ordinating devices as is the case in the Neoclassical
model; we share this conclusion with Keynes. Furthermore, we believe, with
8Notice that an accommodating monetary policy would have a role, even if less im-
portant, in case of a demand shock as well (figures available upon request). In fact, the
demand drop reduces sales and hence internal funds; an accommodating monetary pol-
icy would allow firms to maintain a balanced structure of productive capacity, and hence
avoid permanent effects of the demand shock.
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Figure 6: Time series. Supply shock with fixed prices (κ = 0) flexible wages
(ν = 0.05) and tight monetary policy.
him, that monetary policy has an essential role in reabsorbing the shock;
but in both cases, as we shall see in the next section, the underlying reasons
are different.
Notice in conclusion that the simulations clarify the analytical difference
between perfect flexibility and strong variability of prices and wages. The
very concept of flexibility relies on a tautology if by perfectly flexible we
mean that prices and wages are at every instant at the value that equates
supplies and demands. Not to be trapped into the tautology, flexibility must
rather be conceived as strong price variability within the context of non
clearing markets. The relation between employment and flexibility appears
then under a completely different light. We just saw that it will be in
fact the result of a complex adjustment process, and will depend on how
this process actually evolves. Trading at false prices creates constraints
and incentives that induce firms to take wrong production and investment
decisions. And what happens sequentially to productive capacity is the
reason of co-ordination problems which arise during adjustment processes.
Thus the problem lies not so much in the persistence of a wrong price than
in the effects on the structure of productive of an excessive volatility.
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Figure 7: Time series. Supply shock with flexible wages and prices (ν = κ =
0.05) and accommodating monetary policy.
5 Similarities and Differences
In our as well as in Keynes’ model wage flexibility is not enough in order to
eliminate unemployment. This is so because employment depends not only
on what happens on the labour market but on a complex process where,
among other things, changes in demand for output play a crucial role. But,
this must again be stressed, we underline that this complex process is stirred
by a breaking of intertemporal co-ordination that is seen at a deeper and
more dynamic level than by Keynes and Leijonhufvud. The focus on the
time structure of the production process deepens in fact the understand-
ing of the origins of a co-ordination failure between saving and investment.
While the problem of the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ value of the interest rate (which
is the determinant of the co-ordination failure of saving and investment in
both Keynes and Leijonhufvud) can be treated within a short run equilib-
rium context, the focus on intertemporal complementarity problems evokes
more properly a sequential disequilibrium process, stressing the links that
shape its evolution and the conditions required for its viability. This has
consequences both on the relation between real wages and employment and
on the nature of economic policy. This is the way in which the essential
Keynesian co-ordination problem is revisited here.
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The fundamental issue raised by Keynes is whether an economy hit by a
(negative) demand shock is able to return to a full employment equilibrium.
One of the major results that he obtains is that money wage flexibility is
not a good means for re-establishing this equilibrium, as it would not “have
the effect of reducing real wages and might even have the effect of increasing
them, through its adverse influence on the volume of output” (Keynes 1936,
p. 269). Furthermore, resistance to money wages cuts is not necessarily a
cause of persistent unemployment. On the contrary, it may be considered
as a necessary condition for avoiding that a cumulative process propels the
economy far away the full employment equilibrium. The emphasis on real
wage effects also shows a distinguishing feature (and in our opinion a limit) of
Keynes’ unemployment theory, namely that it remains an essentially static
theory, still firmly rooted into the classical inverse relation between real
wage and employment. However, as Patinkin puts it “once we throw off the
restrictions of static equilibrium analysis, we also free ourselves of the ne-
cessity of assuming wage rigidity as a necessary precondition of involuntary
unemployment. For, during any given period of time, the dynamic workings
of the system may well keep the workers at a point off their supply curve. In
this departure from the supply curve lies the involuntariness of unemploy-
ment. The important point is that this situation can exist regardless of the
shape of supply curve; that is, even if wages are not rigid” (Patinkin 1972
p. 30).
The model we presented avoids the limits of Keynes’ static approach.
As a consequence, there is no longer an inverse relation between real wage
and employment. Decreasing nominal wages may have the effect of reducing
real wages. But, in this case, unemployment, instead of being re-absorbed,
may still be increasing. A major result of our sequential analysis of out-
of-equilibrium processes, is that wage flexibility does not necessarily help
to restore equilibrium face to an exogenous shock, whatever the nature of
the shock; more than that, it may be harmful, by triggering processes that
bring the economy farther and farther from equilibrium; this confirms the
conclusions of Keynes as regards money wages flexibility, but extends this
conclusion also to real wages flexibility. The reason for this result is that
when adjustment is not instantaneous (both in the agent’s decision processes
and in the technological structure), and actions are irreversible, a frictionless
system may become extremely unstable, while what are generally seen as
‘market imperfections’ contribute to smooth the effects of ‘wrong’ actions,
and hence help maintaining the system viable. In a world characterized by
adaptive behaviours, and by a temporally articulated production structure,
the conventional wisdom is reversed: market imperfections may be a factor
of stability of the system rather than an obstacle on the way to fully optimal
equilibria. More specifically, given the characteristics of the system, the
rigidity of wages is necessary to keep the system itself viable, and, as such,
may be considered as the expression of a rational behaviour.
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We stressed, on the other hand, that Keynes does not succeed in devel-
oping a dynamic framework, and hence has to rely on short run distortions
in the price mechanism hard to defend when considering the long run. In our
framework this result obtains because of intrinsic characteristics of the sys-
tem (the existence of irreversibilities) and hence problems of co-ordination
appear both in the long and short run.
Another point of contact between our analysis and the Keynesian ap-
proach is the importance of monetary policy. As stressed by Keynes, “while
a flexible wage policy and a flexible money policy come, analytically, to the
same thing, inasmuch as they are alternative means of changing the quan-
tity of money in terms of wage units, in other respects there is, of course, a
world of difference between them” (Keynes 1936, p. 267).
The ‘world of difference’ between these two instruments, in Keynes, in
the neoclassical synthesis of Patinkin (1965), and more recently in Stiglitz
(1999), is mainly distributional, concerning the burden of the adjustment.
By focusing on the problems of co-ordination faced by a perturbed economy,
our numerical experiments suggest another difference, namely the opposite
effects of these policies on employment via the structure of productive capac-
ity. A flexible or accommodating monetary policy allows to smooth liquidity
constraints while the effect of flexible wages is to aggravate the distortions
in the structure of productive capacity. In our analysis there is no analyti-
cal equivalence between monetary policy and wage flexibility, and hence the
difference between the two instruments may not be reduced to a problem of
‘social opportunity’.
To conclude, we believe that both Keynes (in the works that have been
done after the Treatise and before the General Theory) and Leijonhufvud
had the right intuition, when they put the problem of co-ordination at the
centre of the analysis of involuntary unemployment. This problem was nev-
ertheless treated within a static framework, in which the whole issue of
co-ordination was reduced to a problem of Pareto inferior equilibria. This
paper represents an attempt to focus on the problems of intertemporal co-
ordination posed by a sequential economy within an out-of-equilibrium dy-
namic context. Our results support the Keynesian intuition, and unemploy-
ment emerges as the result of a lack of co-ordination, which is hampered by
irreversible constrained choices. We believe that in doing so we succeed in
strengthening Keynes’ analysis, and in freeing his policy prescriptions from
the fate of short run tools.
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